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Using a Certificate Public Key to Protect DKIM Public Key Spoofing 
 
Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) is a standard that allows domain 
owners to coordinate with Mail User Agents (MUAs) (i.e., email clients) to display brand-
specific indicators next to properly authenticated messages.  The BIMI standard relies on the 
domain name system (DNS) to specify policies and to assist with authenticating email along with 
authentication protocols such as Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and 
Conformance (DMARC), Sender Policy Framework (SPF), and DomainKeys Identified Mail 
(DKIM).  Brand Indicators for Message Identification describes to email services how to fetch 
and authenticate a brand indicator (e.g., a logo) to display to a user to identify the sender of the 
message.  However, DNS is susceptible to several different spoofing attacks such as DNS cache 
poisoning, Border Gateway Protocol (BPG) attacks, etc.   
A Verified Mark Certificate (VMC), which is validated by a third party Certificate 
Authority (CA), helps protect against spoofing attacks by including a proof mechanism to 
validate, using public-key cryptography, each organization with their associated logo.  However, 
currently the entity certificate public key is not used as a signature.  While DKIM (RFC6376) 
and SPF (RFC7208) authenticate the email sender, they are both still susceptible to DNS attacks 
and neither provides graphical logos to identify messages1.  Additionally, Secure/Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) (RFC5751) also authenticates email messages, but is not in 
common use and also does not provide graphical logos to identify messages.  Various propriety 
solutions exist to provide logos, however these methods rely on the host company of the email 
                                                            
1 See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5751 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6376 
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service to validate the logos which is problematic as it lacks scalability, lacks uniformity, and 
poses a significant burden on the host company.2  
This paper offers a profile that aligns the DKIM public key and the VMC end-entity 
public key with each other (i.e., make them equivalent).  Thus, if the DKIM DNS policy record 
is spoofed or otherwise attacked, the email service may detect the attack and untrust the message 
published via the spoofed DNS record.  While the proposed profile still uses DKIM to perform 
initial message validation, the profile also allows for DNS attacks to be exposed.    
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Figure 1 
As illustrated in Figure 1 above, the CA validates and associates a logo with the email 
sender organization and issues the email sender organization a VMC.  This VMC is associated 
with a public key created by the email sender organization (and to which the email sender 
organization maintains the associated private key).  The email sender organization, when sending 
an email to a user, aligns the DKIM public key with the public key associated with the VMC.  
That is, the email sender organization ensures that the DKIM public key matches (i.e., is the 
                                                            
2 See, for example https://support.google.com/business/thread/1858263?hl=en and 
https://partner.microsoft.com/en‐us/marketing/branding 
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same) as the VMC public key.  The email sender organization indicates this alignment via, for 
example, a policy object identifier (OID). 
The user’s email service receives the email from the email sender organization and, upon 
detecting the feature via the policy OID, verifies the alignment of the VMC public key and the 
DKIM public key.  When the VMC public key and the DKIM public key are aligned (and the 
VMC is properly authenticated), the email service provides the email to the user with the logo 
displayed.  When the VMC public key and the DKIM public key do not align (i.e., they are not 
equal), the email service rejects authentication and refuses to display the logo with the message.  
Additionally, the email service may impose additional penalties upon the message.  For example, 
the email service displays a warning along with the message or hides the message from the user 
(e.g., places the message in a spam folder). 
The solution described may be used for all messages sent using the BIMI standard.  The 
solution provides a use for the currently unused public key associated with a VMC and thus 
requires minimal impact to current infrastructure.  The use of a standard such as BIMI with the 
proposed solution allows all domain owners interested in ensuring that their logos are displayed 
correctly to publish brand logos for use with any participating MUA, thus offering more 
flexibility and scalability than current proprietary solutions. 
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ABSTRACT 
 Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) is a standard that allows domain 
owners to coordinate with Mail User Agents (MUAs) to display brand-specific indicators or 
logos next to properly authenticated messages.  A Verified Mark Certificate allows an email 
service to authenticate a logo, but currently BIMI is susceptible to DNS spoofing attacks.  In this 
work, BIMI messages are protected from DNS spoofing by aligning the message’s DomainKeys 
Identified Mail (DKIM) public key with the public key associated with the VMC.  The email 
service may validate the alignment between the keys as part of the authentication of the message.  
When the keys match, the email service may display the indicator or logo along with the 
message.  When the keys do not match, the email service may reject the authentication and not 
display the logo or indicator.   
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